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A CASE FOR ARBITRATION: THE 
PHILIPPINES’ SOLUTION FOR THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA DISPUTE 
EMMA KINGDON* 
Abstract: Arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would be the most effective resolution method and 
would lead to the most favorable outcome for the Philippines against China in the 
South China Sea (SCS) Dispute. The Philippines will likely not pursue adjudica-
tion in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) because the court would likely 
grant sovereignty over any islands to China, thus legitimizing China’s aggressive 
actions in the SCS. Furthermore, continued negotiations are also not a viable op-
tion for the Philippines because any agreement would be inadequate to deter 
China from future actions in the SCS. Under the Annex VII approach, a holding 
by an arbitral tribunal in the Philippines’ favor would enable the states of the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to present a united front to China 
that the only acceptable basis for maritime claims in the SCS must be under UN-
CLOS and would ensure access to the abundance of natural resources in the SCS 
that are central to the Southeast Asian economies. Overall, not only will arbitra-
tion lead to the most efficient and favorable outcome for the Philippines, it will 
also lay the groundwork for future stability among all claimant states in the SCS. 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2013, the Philippines submitted for arbitration a claim against 
the People’s Republic of China for violations of the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) after more than a decade of unsuc-
cessful bilateral and multilateral negotiations over territorial claims in the 
South China Sea (SCS).1 The Philippines is one of five countries challenging 
China’s claims of ownership over the area, rumored to be rich not only in liv-
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 1 Greg Torode, Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China Gathers Pace, REUTERS 
(Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98Q0
BX20130927, archived at http://perma.cc/8P67-CXGP; Audio tape: A Discussion on the Philippines’ 
South China Sea Arbitration Case, held by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (Dec. 3, 
2013), available at https://csis.org/multimedia/audio-discussion-philippines-south-china-sea-arbitration-
case, archived at http://perma.cc/5XE7-SY35 [hereinafter Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration 
Case] (arguing that the Philippines engaged in negotiations with China over this dispute since 1995 
and that at no point was any progress made). 
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ing resources, but also in non-living resources.2 China responded to the claim 
in an unprecedented manner and refused to participate in the UN arbitration 
process, becoming the first state to decline taking part in an inter-state arbitra-
tion under UNCLOS.3 The Philippines submitted its formal case to the UN 
arbitration tribunal of judges, an arbitral body, in March 2014 and China must 
submit a Counter-Memorial responding to the Philippines by December 2014.4 
The Philippines has three options under UNCLOS for resolving the SCS 
conflict.5 Although these proceedings default to arbitration when neither state 
selects a dispute resolution mechanism, the parties could agree to either adju-
dication or negotiation.6 This Note argues that arbitration would be the most 
effective and favorable course of action for the Philippines because a decision 
may be issued as early as May 2015, and its binding effect will deter China 
from future actions while strengthening the legal basis for other Southeast 
Asian states’ claims in this critical area.7 
Part I of this Note addresses the historical backdrop against which the ef-
fectiveness of the arbitration must be assessed. Part II discusses the Philip-
pines’ claims against China, as well as the current state of maritime law under 
UNCLOS. It lays out a framework by which the arbitral tribunal will likely 
assess the Philippines’ claims by comparison to comparable maritime territori-
al disputes that have been resolved through the Annex VII arbitral tribunal pro-
ceedings, as well as compares this assessment to adjudication and negotiation 
proceedings. Part III argues that the Philippines will be most successful against 
China under the Annex VII arbitration process as opposed to resolution 
through other mechanisms. Part III further contends that arbitration best ena-
bles the other nations embroiled in the South China Sea conflict to hold China 
accountable to the decision and force China to fully respect their rights under 
UNCLOS. 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Paul Lewis, China Pulls Out of UN Process over Territorial Dispute with Philippines, GUARD-
IAN, Dec. 6, 2013, at 1; see also Jeff Himmelman, A Game of Shark and Minnow, N.Y. TIMES MAGA-
ZINE, Oct. 27, 2013, at 32. 
 3 Lewis, supra note 2, at 2. 
 4 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration between the Republic of the Philip-
pines and the People’s Republic of China: The Arbitral Tribunal Sets Further Proceedings, PCA 
121063 (June 3, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, PCA 121063]. 
 5 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 279, 287(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397, 508, 509–10, 561 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 6 See id. at 510, art. 287(5). 
 7 See GREGORY B. POLING, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. [CSIS], THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN 
FOCUS: CLARIFYING THE LIMITS OF MARITIME DISPUTE 4 (2013), available at http://csis.org/files/
publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9UVC-MBGS. But 
cf. Himmelman, supra note 2, at 43 (arguing that although a decision may be rendered as early as 
March 2015, China would unlikely be deterred by an unfavorable outcome). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of the Territorial Dispute 
The SCS is a large, semi-enclosed marginal ocean basin bordered by Vi-
etnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, China, and Taiwan.8 It is 
approximately 550–650 nautical miles (nm) wide and more than 1200 nm 
long, covering a total area of 3.5 million square kilometers.9 The SCS is locat-
ed on the major international shipping route between the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans, and thus serves as a “vital international passageway.”10 It is bordered 
by several of the world’s most rapidly industrializing countries, and is there-
fore, central to the Southeast Asian economies, namely due to its abundance of 
natural resources.11 The SCS has a large and complex marine ecosystem that 
has attracted coastal states to develop fishing industries.12 In addition, the SCS 
is rich in oil and gas.13 Ensuring access to these vital resources is an important 
consideration that sparked the territorial dispute between China and the other 
coastal states, including the Philippines.14 
The area in dispute that is most hotly contested is the Spratlys Islands, lo-
cated on the east side of the SCS.15 The Spratlys Islands consist of more than 
140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals, and sandbanks, including a reef the Philippines 
call Ayungin, the most recent site of conflict with China.16 Less than forty of 
the features are above water at high tide; instead, they are either completely 
submerged or are only above water at low tide.17 The Spratlys Islands are be-
lieved to be sitting atop vast oil and gas reserves.18 All of the Spratly Islands 
are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam.19 Malaysia also lays claim over 
certain parts of the islands and reefs and controls eight islands that fall within 
its continental shelf.20 In addition, Brunei claims two reefs and a maritime 
zone based on its continental shelf.21 The Philippines maintains separate claims 
to a portion of the Spratlys Islands, known as the Kalayaan Island Group 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the 
South China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2013). 
 9 Id.; Guifang Xue, Deep Danger: Intensified Competition in the South China Sea and Implications 
for China, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 307, 308 (2012). 
 10 Beckman, supra note 8, at 143; Xue, supra note 9, at 308. 
 11 Xue, supra note 9, at 309. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Beckman, supra note 8, at 143; Xue, supra note 9, at 311. 
 16 Beckman, supra note 8, at 143; see Himmelman, supra note 2, at 26. 
 17 Beckman, supra note 8, at 143. 
 18 Xue, supra note 9, at 311. 
 19 Beckman, supra note 8, at 144. 
 20 Xue, supra note 9, at 311. 
 21 Id. 
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(KIG), which includes Ayungin Reef.22 The Philippines is currently fending off 
Chinese pressure to claim this area.23 To maintain its sovereignty, the Philip-
pine government permanently stations eight troops on a warship that was run 
aground on the reef in 1999.24 The Chinese, however, have stationed two coast 
guard boats at either side of the reef, preventing the Philippine Navy from re-
supplying their troops.25 The Chinese Army has made it clear that when the 
troops leave the reef to resupply, they will never be allowed to return.26 The 
Chinese are sure this will eventually happen, given the lack of food and drink-
ing water on the reef and China’s restriction on access to the reef; thus, the 
Philippines will lose its claim.27 
The Scarborough Shoal is another disputed feature in the SCS, claimed by 
China, the Philippines, and Taiwan.28 It is a large atoll with a lagoon surround-
ed by a reef.29 Most of the reef is completely submerged or above water only at 
low tide, but there are several small rocks that are above water at high tide.30 
China and the Philippines engaged in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal in 
2012.31 The Philippines caught the Chinese harvesting coral and endangered 
species within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and sent a 
warship to expel the fishing boats.32 The Chinese responded with its own civil-
ian boats and the situation escalated into a two-month standoff.33 The United 
States facilitated an agreement for both countries’ ships to leave the shoal 
peacefully, but China never withdrew its presence.34 In contrast, China’s Army 
has implemented a “cabbage strategy”—basically blocking access to the shoal 
by surrounding the area with a nest of boats that includes a combination of ci-
vilian and military ships—in order to ward off any foreign fishermen.35 
The final disputed feature between the Philippines and China is Mischief 
Reef.36 Mischief is another submerged reef, located 20 nm west of Ayungin.37 
It previously belonged to the Philippines, as the reef is within its EEZ; howev-
er, in 1994, the Chinese took advantage of the Philippine Navy’s hiatus due to 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. 
 23 See Himmelman, supra note 2, at 26, 29. 
 24 Id. at 26. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 30. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Beckman, supra note 8, at 145. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; Himmelman, supra note 2, at 29. 
 32 Himmelman, supra note 2, at 29. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration Case, supra note 1. 
 37 Himmelman, supra note 2, at 33. 
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a typhoon and erected a structure.38 The Chinese have since built a large mili-
tary structure and have made it clear that they are not going to leave.39 
On November 4, 2002, the foreign ministers of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), including delegates from each of the claiming 
states, signed a declaration regarding the dispute in the SCS entitled “Declara-
tion on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC).40 In the DOC, 
the parties decided to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means, including an agreement to engage in direct negotiations with 
the sovereign states concerned and to not resort to the threat or use of force.41 
The DOC does not exclude any further procedure, but instructs the parties to 
commit to exercising self-restraint and refrain from conducting activities that 
could escalate the dispute, such as inhabiting previously uninhabited islands, 
reefs, shoals, and other features.42 The hope for the DOC was that it would 
create the conditions necessary to establish a peaceful and durable solution in 
the SCS.43 
After several years of negotiations, however, the territorial dispute esca-
lated sharply in 2009 as a result of the submission of claims to the United Na-
tion’s Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) for an extended 
continental shelf by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam.44 Under Article 4 
of Annex II to UNCLOS, a coastal state intending to extend its continental 
shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm is obligated to submit those limits to the 
CLCS.45 The Philippines made the first submission on April 8, 2009, but it on-
ly concerned the Benham Rise region, located east of the Philippines in the 
Philippine Sea.46 On May 6, 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a joint 
proposal regarding the southern part of the SCS, and Vietnam submitted an 
additional proposal regarding the area north of that stipulated in the joint pro-
posal.47 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, ASSOC. OF S.E. ASIAN NATIONS 
[ASEAN], http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-
sea, archived at http://perma.cc/9SYB-Y34F (adopted Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter DOC]. Members of 
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Thailand, and Viet Nam. Member States, ASEAN, http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-member-states 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L9GB-Z8M8. 
 41 DOC, supra note 40, ¶ 4. 
 42 Id. ¶ 5. 
 43 Id. at pmbl. 
 44 Xue, supra note 9, at 313. 
 45 UNCLOS, supra note 5, at Annex II, art. 4. 
 46 U.N. Secretary-General, Receipt of the Submission Made by the Republic of the Philippines to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. 09/132 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/phl22_09/clcs22_2009e.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/32DR-4ZZJ; Xue, supra note 9, at 313. 
 47 Xue, supra note 9, at 313. 
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China immediately objected to the Malaysian and Vietnamese submis-
sions, and on May 7, 2009, submitted two note verbales to the CLCS.48 China 
stated that it possessed “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the [SCS] 
and the adjacent waters, and enjoy[ed] sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil.”49 China further asserted 
that the Malaysian and Vietnamese submissions “seriously infringed [on] Chi-
na’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the [SCS]” and attached 
its Nine-Dash Line map to specify the boundaries of its claim.50 The language 
in these notes and the attached map severely escalated the territorial disputes 
and sparked protests from many of the coastal states.51 
B. China’s Claim Under the Nine-Dash Line 
In its assertion to the UN Secretary General, China claimed that every-
thing, including both land and sea, encompassed within the Nine-Dash Line is 
area over which it exercises sovereignty.52 This encompasses 70–75 percent of 
the SCS.53 The Nine-Dash Line is derived from ancient Xia and Han dynasty 
records and a map produced in 1947, known as the Eleven-Dash Line, that in-
dicated the geographical scope of its authority over the SCS.54 Two dashes 
were removed from the Eleven-Dash Line, establishing the current Nine-Dash 
Line, in 1953.55 In 1956, China issued a statement in response to a suggestion 
by the Philippines that some of the SCS islands “should” belong to the Philip-
pines because of their proximity.56 This statement reiterated that the SCS is-
lands, including the Spratlys Islands, were inherently Chinese territory, as they 
had fallen during World War II to the Japanese and were recovered by the Chi-
nese government upon Japan’s surrender.57 
In 1992, China promulgated its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone.58 Article 2 of this law includes the four island groups in the SCS, 
including Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys, within the land territory of Chi-
na.59 When China ratified UNCLOS in 1996, China stated that it “reaffirm[ed] 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 314. 
 49 Id. (quoting People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009)). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 315. 
 52 Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration Case, supra note 1. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and 
Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98, 102 (2013); Himmelman, supra note 2, at 28. 
 55 Gao & Jia, supra note 54, at 103. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 104. 
 59 Id. 
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its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in Article 2” of the 
1992 law.60 
C. The Philippines’ Decision to Submit to Arbitration 
All of the claimants to the SCS territorial dispute rarely find agreement, 
but there was near universal support of the coastal states about the illegitimacy 
of the Nine-Dash Line.61 China’s note verbale to the CLCS objecting to the 
Malaysian and Vietnamese submissions and introducing the map with the 
Nine-Dash Line sparked a furious exchange of diplomatic notes.62 In its note 
verbale on May 8, 2010, Vietnam reasserted the claim to its territory and stated 
that the map had no legal, historical, or factual basis.63 In July 2010, Indonesia 
submitted its own note verbale focusing on the implications of the Chinese 
map, stating that it “clearly lack[ed] international legal basis and is tantamount 
to upset the UNCLOS.”64 
On April 5, 2011, the Philippines submitted a note verbale responding to 
the Chinese map.65 First, it claimed that the KIG constitutes a part of the Phil-
ippines.66 Second, it asserted “sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters 
around or adjacent to each relevant geological feature in the KIG as provided 
for” by UNCLOS.67 Third, it stated that “the relevant waters as well as the 
seabed and subsoil” claimed as shown in the “so-called 9-dash line map . . . 
would have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS.”68 In the 
Philippines’ view, sovereignty and jurisdiction over those areas belong to the 
appropriate coastal or archipelagic state to which those bodies of waters, as 
well as seabed and subsoil, are next to, either as part of the territorial sea or the 
200 nm EEZ and Continental Shelf in accordance with Articles 3, 4, 55, 57, 
and 76 of UNCLOS.69 
In the case of the Philippines, the Nine-Dash Line comes within 50 nm of 
the island of Luzan and within 30 nm of the island of Palawan.70 At its farthest, 
the Nine-Dash Line is more than 800 nm from China’s mainland coast.71 The 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. 
 61 Xue, supra note 9, at 312, 315, 316. 
 62 See id. at 315. 
 63 See Gao & Jia, supra note 54, at 106. 
 64 Id. at 107 (quoting Note Verbale No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 from the Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Indonesia to the UN Secretary-General (July 8, 2010)). 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. (quoting Note Verbale No. 000228 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines to the UN Secretary-General (Apr. 5, 2011)). 
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 68 Id. 
 69 See Gao & Jia, supra note 54, at 107. 
 70 Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration Case, supra note 1. 
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Philippines has spent many years in negotiations with China, mainly bilateral 
and some multilateral, but at no point was any progress made.72 Furthermore, 
given the escalating conflicts at the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and the 
Ayungin Reef in Spring 2013, China has indicated that it would not soften its 
position.73 In a note verbale dated February 19, 2013, China asserted that by ini-
tiating arbitration proceedings, the Philippines was acting in contravention of the 
2002 DOC, in which all ASEAN states agreed to resolve their territorial and ju-
risdictional disputes through friendly negotiations.74 The Philippines, however, 
cannot viably confront China militarily and does not have the economic power 
to affect China’s decision-making, and thus, the only option for the Philippines is 
the law.75 By bringing its complaints to arbitration, the Philippines is using the 
only leverage it has—bringing international attention to the issue.76 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1. The Content of UNCLOS 
UNCLOS establishes the legal framework for evaluating all legal disputes 
in the oceans.77 The Convention provides legal order to facilitate international 
communication and promotes the peaceful, equitable, and efficient use of the 
oceans.78 UNCLOS defines offshore features and sets out the maritime zones 
determined by offshore features.79 
Each state is entitled to certain maritime zones under UNCLOS.80 A coastal 
state may establish a territorial sea up to 12 nm from its land territory and may 
exercise complete sovereignty over that water, seabed, and subsoil.81 In addition, 
a coastal state may also exercise sovereign rights on the Continental Shelf, for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas, for up to 200 nm from its land territory.82 A state 
is also entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where it has sovereign 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Note Verbale No. (13) PG-039 from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Repub-
lic of the Philippines to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (Feb. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/cdn/files/gar/china_note_verbale.pdf, ar-
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 75 Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration Case, supra note 1. 
 76 Himmelman, supra note 2, at 43. 
 77 See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at pmbl. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. arts. 121(1)–(2). 
 80 See id. arts. 2, 57. 
 81 Id. arts. 2, 3. 
 82 Id. arts. 76, 77. 
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rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting living and non-living resources 
of the waters for up to 200 nm from its land territory.83 The coastal state’s rights 
include the jurisdiction to establish and use artificial islands, installations, and 
structures.84 
Offshore features are also entitled to maritime zones, although these 
zones differ depending on UNCLOS’s classification of the feature as an island, 
rock, low tide elevation, or artificial island.85 An island is a naturally formed 
area of land that remains above water at high tide.86 An island is entitled to the 
same maritime zones as land territory, including a 12 nm territorial sea and a 
200 nm EEZ and Continental Shelf.87 Rocks are a sub-category of islands, and 
also remain above water at high tide.88 Rocks are distinguishable from islands, 
however, because they cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own; rocks are therefore only entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea.89 A low 
tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land that is above water at low tide 
but submerged at high tide.90 A low tide elevation located within a coastal 
state’s territorial sea may be utilized as a baseline for measuring the state’s ter-
ritorial sea.91 If it is situated beyond 12 nm from a coastal state, however, it 
does not have a territorial sea of its own.92 Similarly, an artificial island is not 
entitled to any maritime zones, except for a 500 meter safety zone.93 Although 
the Convention provides the definitions to classify offshore features, it does 
not contain any provisions regarding how to decide competing sovereignty 
claims.94 
2. Dispute Settlement Under UNCLOS 
Although UNCLOS contains no guidance to assist states in resolving 
competing claims to sovereignty, the Convention does contain a complex sys-
tem for settling disputes between parties over the interpretation or application 
of its provisions.95 The default rule is that if there is a dispute between two 
states concerning the interpretation or application of any provision in the Con-
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. arts. 56(1), 57.  
 84 Id. art. 56(1). 
 85 Id. art. 121(1). 
 86 Id. arts. 121(2)–(3). 
 87 Id. arts. 3, 77, 121(2). 
 88 See id. arts. 121(1), 121(3). 
 89 See id. art. 121(3). 
 90 Id. art. 13(1). 
 91 Id. arts. 13(1)–(2). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. arts. 60(5), 60(8). 
 94 POLING, supra note 7, at IX. 
 95 Beckman, supra note 8, at 142. 
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vention, they are subject to compulsory binding dispute settlement.96 States are 
first obligated to try to settle the dispute through peaceful means through the 
process outlined in Section 1 of Part XV.97 Under Article 282, if the parties to 
the dispute have agreed through a general, regional, or bilateral agreement that 
the dispute be submitted to a procedure resulting in a binding decision, that 
procedure will be utilized in lieu of the UNCLOS procedure.98 The parties are 
obligated to exchange views expeditiously to negotiate a settlement.99 
If no settlement is reached through the process in Section 1, either party 
may submit the dispute to a court or tribunal with jurisdiction, as outlined in 
Section 2 of Part XV.100 The court or tribunal with jurisdiction to hear a dispute 
depends on whether the parties selected a procedure for resolving disputes.101 
Upon signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS, under Article 287 a state is 
free to choose one or more of four possible procedures for settling disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.102 A state may 
elect to: (1) adjudicate before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS); (2) adjudicate before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); (3) ar-
bitrate before an Annex VII tribunal; or (4) arbitrate before a special tribunal 
under Annex VIII.103 
If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for settle-
ment, the dispute may only be submitted to that procedure, unless the parties 
agree otherwise.104 If the parties did not accept the same procedure, or if a par-
ty did not select a choice of one of the four procedures, the dispute may only 
be submitted to Annex VII arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise.105 
Any decision rendered by an Annex VII tribunal is final and binding on all the 
parties to the dispute.106 
B. Adjudication Under UNCLOS 
1. Structure and Function of Adjudication 
Under Article 287, a state may select or agree to adjudicate a dispute be-
fore ITLOS or the ICJ.107 Each compulsory dispute resolution body has juris-
                                                                                                                           
 96 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 286. 
 97 Id. art. 279. 
 98 Id. art. 282. 
 99 Id. art. 283(1). 
 100 Id. art. 286. 
 101 See id. art. 287. 
 102 Id. art. 287(1). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. art. 287(4). 
 105 Id. arts. 287(3), 287(5). 
 106 Id. art. 296(1). 
 107 Id. art. 287(1). 
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diction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention.108 While both tribunals have been granted potentially extensive 
jurisdiction, the claims brought before ITLOS have been limited in number 
and scope.109 Under UNCLOS, compulsory jurisdiction has been granted to 
ITLOS to hear “prompt release” cases and cases seeking provisional measures 
but for which an arbitral tribunal has not yet been formed.110 Thus, ITLOS 
gained the reputation as a court of first instance for deciding questions of an 
urgent matter that require prompt resolution, but not a tribunal for final deter-
mination.111 As a result, the ICJ has become the adjudicatory arm of the United 
Nations and issues final binding decisions on conflicts arising under the Con-
vention.112 
2. Criteria for Classifying Offshore Features and Determining Sovereignty 
In the landmark decision Nicaragua v. Honduras, the ICJ outlined the cri-
teria for classifying offshore features and the four principles for evaluating 
sovereignty disputes.113 In that case, Nicaragua filed an application requesting 
that the court determine the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Hon-
duras in the Caribbean Sea.114 During the proceedings, Nicaragua also request-
ed that the court decide the question of sovereignty over the islands and other 
features within the area in dispute.115 
As a result of the vagueness of Nicaragua’s request, the court could only 
make determinations regarding the legal characterization and sovereignty of 
the four features named by Honduras.116 The court found that the four main 
cays in dispute remained above water at high tide and thus, fell within the def-
inition of islands under Article 121 of UNCLOS.117 With the exception of these 
four islands, the court determined there was an insufficiency of information to 
classify the other offshore features in the disputed area.118 The court, however, 
noted that it was not “aware of a uniform and widespread State practice which 
might have given rise to a customary rule which unequivocally permits or ex-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. art. 288(1). 
 109 Jillaine Seymour, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Great Mistake?, 13 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2006). 
 110 Id. at 15. 
 111 Id. at 16, 20. 
 112 See C. Leah Granger, The Role of International Tribunals in Natural Resource Disputes in Latin 
America, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1297, 1313 (2007). 
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cludes appropriation of low tide elevations.”119 The court reasoned that the 
existing rules did not establish that low tide elevations could be fully assimi-
lated with islands and thus, it could not make a determinative finding on their 
sovereignty.120 
In determining the sovereignty of the four identified islands, the court 
considered four principles: the principle of uti possidetis juris, post-colonial 
effectivités, the evidentiary value of maps, and recognition by third states.121 
The court found the principle of uti possidetis juris could apply to offshore 
possessions and maritime spaces, as a key aspect of uti possidetis juris is to 
deny the possibility of terra nullius.122 While the court assumed that these is-
lands were under the rule of the Spanish crown, in order to claim sovereignty 
under this principle, it must be shown that the predecessor state allocated the 
islands to one of its successor states.123 The court held that neither Nicaragua 
nor Honduras produced documentary evidence from the pre-independence era 
that explicitly refers to the islands and determined that proximity alone to the 
islands did not establish legal title.124 Thus, the question of sovereignty over 
the islands could not be determined under the principle of uti possidetis ju-
ris.125 
The court found that evidence of post-colonial effectivités facilitated the 
determination of the sovereignty of the islands.126 A sovereign title may be in-
ferred from the effective exercise of authority over a territory.127 The court 
even decided that sovereignty over maritime features, such as these islands, 
could be established by only a relatively modest display of state power.128 Evi-
dence of acts of legislative and administrative control, the application and en-
forcement of civil and criminal law, the regulation of immigration, fishing ac-
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tivities, naval patrols, an oil concession practice, and public works could 
demonstrate the existence of such effectivités.129 
The court also considered the evidentiary value of maps in confirming 
sovereignty over the disputed islands.130 For a map to be considered in decid-
ing a question of sovereignty, it must be geographically accurate.131 The court 
determined, however, that evidence of sovereignty solely from maps could not 
constitute a territorial title; thus, the submission of cartographic material only 
serves to support claims and confirm arguments.132 
The court also reviewed whether recognition by third states and bilateral 
treaties contributed to a finding of sovereignty.133 If the evidence of recogni-
tion is neither consistent nor consecutive, it does not signify an explicit ac-
knowledgment of sovereignty.134 The court also found that bilateral treaties 
were irrelevant in showing title over the disputed islands.135 
C. Arbitrations Under Annex VII of UNCLOS 
1. Efficiency of Arbitration 
Under Article 287, a state may select or agree to arbitrate a dispute before 
an Annex VII arbitral tribunal or an Annex VIII special tribunal.136 The Annex 
VIII special tribunal, however, is a forum of limited jurisdiction.137 Thus, if a 
state does not select or agree to the same resolution mechanism, the dispute will 
be submitted for arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS, as that forum has 
general jurisdiction to hear all disputes arising under the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Convention.138 As compared to adjudication, the Annex VII arbitra-
tion process has issued fair and binding decisions without prolonging the litiga-
tion process.139 Given the expediency of the arbitration process, the expertise to 
hear a wide range of complex issues, and the absence of declarations made under 
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Article 287 regarding choice of procedure, the Annex VII arbitral tribunals have 
become an increasingly popular forum to settle disputes.140 
The Annex VII arbitral tribunal consists of five members.141 Each party to 
the proceeding may appoint one member of the tribunal and the remaining 
three are appointed by agreement.142 If the parties cannot agree on the mem-
bers to be appointed by agreement, the president of ITLOS appoints the re-
maining tribunal members.143 If one of the parties to the dispute fails to appear 
before the tribunal, the other party may request that the tribunal continue the 
proceedings and issue its award.144 The arbitral tribunal’s award is final and 
may not be appealed.145 
2. Jurisdiction 
Early decisions under this process established the jurisdiction of the An-
nex VII arbitral tribunals.146 The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago dispute was 
the first Annex VII arbitration to render an award on the merits; prior to its 
seminal decision, however, the tribunal had to determine whether it had the 
jurisdiction to issue an award.147 
The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago dispute emerged after nine rounds of 
failed negotiations concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary.148 The 
tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction as the parties satisfied Section 1 of 
Part XV, UNCLOS’s dispute settlement procedures.149 Furthermore, the tribu-
nal reasoned that Article 281, which extends the dispute resolution procedures 
after peaceful attempts have been made, was intended to cover circumstances 
where the parties had come to an ad hoc agreement as to how to settle a partic-
ular dispute.150 When the chosen method of peaceful settlement failed to result 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See Stephen Fietta, Guyana/Suriname Award, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 120 (2008); see also 
Seymour, supra note 109, at 10 n.53 (stating that of the 149 states that are parties to UNCLOS, only 35 of 
those made Article 287 declarations). See generally Guyana v. Suriname, ¶¶ 1, 488 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-Suriname%20Award.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/YT9U-UL4J (an Annex VII arbitral tribunal resolved another maritime dispute in three years). 
 141 UNCLOS, supra note 5, Annex VII art. 3(a). 
 142 Id. at Annex VII, arts. 3(b)–(d). 
 143 Id. at Annex VII, art. 3(e). 
 144 Id. at Annex VII, art 9. 
 145 Id. at Annex VII, art. 11. 
 146 See Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Landmark 2006 UNCLOS Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and 
Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction & Merits) Award, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573, 
585 (2007). 
 147 See id. at 576, 579. 
 148 Id. at 578. 
 149 See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 279. See generally Barbados, 45 I.L.M. 800, ¶¶ 194–195 
(parties engaged in negotiations both formally and informally but reached no agreement within a reason-
able period of time). 
 150 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 281; Kwiatkowska, supra note 146, at 588. 
2015] Philippines’ Solution for the South China Sea Dispute 143 
in settlement, the tribunal found that, under Article 281(1), submission to an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal was then appropriate.151 
Furthermore, the tribunal also determined that instituting arbitration pro-
ceedings unilaterally against a state is an inherent part of the UNCLOS dispute 
settlement.152 The tribunal found that invoking the arbitration procedure is not 
an abuse of right contrary to UNCLOS or to international law generally.153 It is 
a straightforward exercise conferred by the treaty, even if done unilaterally and 
without discussion or agreement with the other party.154 
3. Scope of Authority 
The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago decisions also established the scope 
of authority of the Annex VII arbitral tribunals.155 In order to decide the merits 
of the case, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation Arbitral 
Tribunal first clarified the scope of its power.156 It found that because the dis-
pute concerned legal rules, the resulting boundary line must be drawn on the 
basis of UNCLOS, the predominant authority on maritime law.157 Thus, in or-
der to render a judgment, the tribunal applied Articles 74(1) and 83(1), which 
contain the law applicable to the delimitation of the EEZ and the Continental 
Shelf.158 The tribunal, however, also determined that it had the right and the 
duty to exercise judicial discretion in order to achieve an equitable result.159 In 
order to achieve an equitable solution, the tribunal deliberated over whether 
the boundary might be adjusted in consideration of geography, proportionality, 
or other special circumstances.160 
The Guyana/Suriname dispute was the second Annex VII arbitration to 
resolve a maritime boundary dispute under UNCLOS and was another land-
mark decision on the scope of authority of the tribunals.161 The Guy-
ana/Suriname dispute arose after an oil-rig-and-drill ship, operating under a 
Guyanese concession, was ordered to leave the contested area by two Suri-
namese naval vessels.162 After three years of failed negotiations regarding the 
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maritime boundary after this incident, Guyana initiated arbitration proceedings 
under Part XV, Section 2 (Annex VII arbitration).163 
The tribunal expanded the decision-making power of the Annex VII arbi-
tration process by considering and ruling on allegations that a state engaged in 
the unlawful use or threat of force under UNCLOS, the UN Charter, and cus-
tomary international law.164 In determining whether the state’s conduct 
amounted to an explicit threat of force, the tribunal considered the statements 
of the main participants.165 It also decided whether the use of force itself would 
have been illegal, because then the threat to use such force would likewise be 
illegal.166 The tribunal reviewed whether the measures were unavoidable, rea-
sonable, and necessary, as that may justify the use of force as law enforcement 
activities under customary international law.167 It ultimately found that Suri-
name acted unlawfully, but determined that an additional order precluding Su-
riname from resorting to further threats of force was unnecessary.168 
D. Negotiations 
Under UNCLOS, parties can agree to settle a dispute concerning the in-
terpretation or application of the Convention through any peaceful means of 
their choice.169 A state may exercise this choice for peaceful measures by bilat-
erally negotiating a settlement.170 
In deciding how to resolve the SCS in the most equitable and peaceful 
way possible, the foreign ministers of the ASEAN states agreed to resolve their 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.171 Vietnam and China 
committed to this approach to resolve their disagreement in the SCS and pro-
vide an example of the outcomes of negotiations in this dispute.172 This strate-
gy is shaped by Vietnam’s history, economy, and geographical proximity to 
China, as Vietnam is highly engaged in trade and investments with China.173 
The negotiations have resulted in both wins and losses for Vietnam.174 In 
1974, Vietnam lost territorial claims in the Paracels as well as part of the Sprat-
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id. 
 164 See Guy. v. Surin., ¶ 439 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).  
 165 Id. ¶ 432. 
 166 Id. ¶ 439. 
 167 Id. ¶ 445. 
 168 Id. ¶ 450. 
 169 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 280. 
 170 See DOC, supra note 40, ¶ 4 (exemplifying the decision by the ASEAN states to engage in 
negotiations). 
 171 Id. 
 172 See Lucio Blanco Pitlo III & Amruta Karambelkar, Philippines and Vietnam in the South 
China Sea, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 21, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/philippines-and-vietnam-in-
the-south-china-sea-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/E5TA-EGMS. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. 
2015] Philippines’ Solution for the South China Sea Dispute 145 
lys Islands in 1988.175 Both countries contested each other’s offshore blocks 
awarded to foreign energy companies and engaged in accusations over arrests 
and harassment of fisherman.176 The commitment to peaceful settlement, how-
ever, also resulted in many positive milestones between the two states.177 
Through negotiations, Vietnam and China demarcated their common land 
boundary, established a joint fishing zone in the Tonkin Gulf, and created a 
fishery hotline to mitigate incidents at sea arising from overlapping fishing 
grounds.178 Furthermore, the countries signed twelve agreements to enhance 
bilateral cooperation in trade, infrastructure, energy, and maritime affairs and 
set up a working group to review joint exploration options in the SCS.179 Thus, 
despite Vietnam’s expression of dissatisfaction with China in ASEAN forums, 
the two states leveraged the approach under the 2002 Declaration and main-
tained strong bilateral relations despite the territorial and maritime disputes in 
the SCS.180 
E. Overview of the Philippines’ Claims Submitted for Arbitration 
Neither the Philippines nor China have made a selection under Article 
287.181 As a result of this abstention, when the Philippines invoked the com-
pulsory binding dispute settlement procedure under Section 2 of Part XV, the 
dispute automatically went to arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS.182 The 
parties could agree, however, to submit the dispute to another method of reso-
lution, including adjudication or bilateral negotiations.183 
The Philippines’ position is that under UNCLOS, to which both China 
and the Philippines are parties, and customary international law, a coastal 
state’s entitlements are prescribed to a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ 
and Continental Shelf.184 Within the 200 nm zone, a state has the exclusive 
entitlement to its resources, both living and non-living in the sea and under the 
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seabed.185 The Philippines has articulated four major claims that it seeks to 
raise against China at the arbitration, which began in March 2014.186 
The Philippines’ first claim is regarding China’s sovereignty claims under 
the Nine-Dash Line.187 By claiming sovereign rights over land and resources 
more than 800 nm from its mainland coast, China is extending its sovereignty 
far beyond the entitlements under UNCLOS.188 The Philippines will argue that 
China’s claims of sovereignty under the Nine-Dash Line are inconsistent with 
UNCLOS.189 Thus, China’s prevention of the Philippines from exploiting natu-
ral resources from the Continental Shelf and exercising fishing rights through-
out the EEZ are unlawful and constitute a trespass of the Philippines’ rights.190 
The other three issues that will be raised by the Philippines concern the sta-
tus of offshore features in the SCS.191 The second major claim is regarding six 
features that protrude above the water at high tide in the Scarborough Shoal.192 
The Philippines will ask the tribunal for a decision of whether these features are 
true islands under Article 121, or whether these features are rocks that cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life on their own.193 The third major claim 
is regarding seven features in the Spratly Islands.194 Three of these features are 
above water at high tide, thus the Philippines will seek a determination of 
whether these features are islands or rocks.195 The remaining four features are 
underwater at all times; thus the Philippines will seek a determination that these 
features are neither islands nor rocks, and are instead a part of the Continental 
Shelf.196 Finally, the fourth major claim is regarding Mischief Reef.197 The Phil-
ippines will request that the tribunal determine whether a state can transform an 
underwater feature into an island by building a structure over it.198 
The Philippines seeks a declaration by the arbitral tribunal that all of the 
rights and entitlements in the SCS, including the rights to resources, are gov-
erned by UNCLOS and thus, the Nine-Dash Line is inconsistent and unlaw-
ful.199 Furthermore, the Philippines seeks a finding that it is entitled to the full 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Id. 
 186 Id.; Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the People’s Republic of China: Arbitral Tribunal Establishes Rules of Procedure and 
Initial Timetable, PCA 101203 (Aug. 27, 2013). 
 187 Discussion on the Philippines’ Arbitration Case, supra note 1. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
2015] Philippines’ Solution for the South China Sea Dispute 147 
enjoyment of its 200 nm EEZ and Continental Shelf and the resources located 
therein, and is free to exploit those resources without interference by China.200 
III. ANALYSIS 
As outlined above, the Philippines is not necessarily limited in its options 
for dispute resolution.201 Though the proceedings may default to arbitration, if 
both parties agree, they could elect to either submit the dispute to adjudication 
before the ICJ or engage in further negotiations.202 This section analyzes the 
relative merits of these three approaches and argues that arbitration would ul-
timately be the most effective and favorable course of action for the Philip-
pines.203 
A. Arbitration: The Most Efficient and Successful Solution  
for the Philippines 
1. Efficiency 
The Annex VII arbitration process will be the most efficient procedure for 
determining a solution to this dispute.204 The arbitral tribunals have become a 
valuable forum for resolving complex issues in an authoritative and compre-
hensive manner within a shorter amount of time than adjudication or negotia-
tion.205 In this case, each state had been asked by the arbitral tribunal to submit 
its position by the end of March 2014.206 The Philippines filed its Memorial on 
March 30, 2014.207 In a procedural order, the arbitral tribunal fixed December 
15, 2014 as the date by which China must submit a Counter-Memorial re-
sponding to the Philippines.208 While the Philippines anticipated the case to 
take three to four years, a decision may be issued as early as March 2015.209 
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Furthermore, the arbitration process has continued despite China’s refusal 
to participate, a unique attribute of the Annex VII arbitration process that could 
not occur under any other dispute resolution mechanism.210 China made it 
clear to the other claimant states that it believes the Philippines has no legal 
grounds and expressed anger that the Philippines raised this dispute to the 
United Nations.211 The arbitral tribunal, however, does not seem deterred by 
the politics and likely recognizes the importance of the decision to the entire 
region.212 Fair decision-making and efficiency in the Philippines/China case 
could provide the right incentive for China to resolve all associated sovereign-
ty disputes, as China may be vulnerable to additional claims being raised to the 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal if the Philippines is successful.213 If China decides 
to settle as a result of the arbitration, it could prompt peaceful resolution be-
tween all of the claimant states of their disputes in this strategically important 
region and thereby, create stability in the South China Sea.214 
2. Jurisdiction 
The arbitral tribunal will also be the forum where the Philippines will 
achieve the most favorable result.215 The jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunals was significantly broadened from judgments in the Barba-
dos/Trinidad and Tobago dispute and the Guyana/Suriname dispute.216 Given 
this expansion and the near universal respect for the United Nations and the 
rule of law, the Philippines will likely receive a judgment in its favor that Chi-
na will feel obligated to obey.217  
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The arbitral tribunal will be able to make a key finding in the Philippines’ 
favor regarding the appropriateness of the decision to submit to arbitration.218 
China could raise the argument that under Article 281, the Philippines may not 
pursue arbitration, as the DOC requires peaceful settlement through negotia-
tions to resolve this dispute.219 The arbitral tribunal will likely find that the 
DOC was an ad hoc agreement, in which the parties had agreed to seek to set-
tle their disputes through negotiations.220 The de facto agreement, however, did 
not exclude any further procedure; therefore, because their chosen peaceful 
settlement procedure failed to result in a settlement, the Philippines may law-
fully apply the procedures under Part XV of UNCLOS.221 
3. Scope of Authority 
The arbitral tribunal will also likely issue an award in the Philippines’ fa-
vor because it derives its scope of authority from UNCLOS.222 The Philippines 
believes that UNCLOS contains important rules and principles that govern the 
validity of claims in the South China Sea and seeks a decision that finds Chi-
na’s claims under the Nine-Dash Line invalid.223 As the arbitral tribunal func-
tions in accordance with UNCLOS, it will likely agree with the Philippines and 
apply Article 121 and Article 13 of the Convention to determine the legal char-
acterization of the offshore features.224 Under Article 121, the Philippines can 
provide sufficient evidence that, although above water at high tide, the six fea-
tures in the Scarborough Shoal cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life on their own.225 Thus, the tribunal will conclude that the features are rocks 
and are only entitled to a territorial sea.226 The Philippines can also show that 
four of the seven features in the Spratly Islands are underwater at all times and 
therefore, the tribunal will find that these features are part of the Continental 
Shelf.227 The tribunal will also determine that UNCLOS defines the three other 
identified features in the Spratlys Islands that are only above water at low tide 
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as low tide elevations.228 Finally, Mischief Reef is another completely under-
water feature identified by the Philippines and the tribunal will also likely 
characterize it as part of the Continental Shelf, as it is never above water.229 
The arbitral tribunal will also likely hold in the Philippines’ favor because 
the tribunal has both the right and the duty to exercise judicial discretion in 
order to achieve an equitable result.230 Thus, in determining the classification 
of the features, the tribunal can consider the inequity of the Nine-Dash Line, as 
it encompasses 75 percent of the SCS, and in some parts, comes within 30 nm 
of the Philippines.231 A decision by the tribunal provides not only a stable legal 
outcome, but also serves as a message to all of the SCS claimants that China’s 
assertion of sovereignty so far from its mainland is inequitable.232 If all parties 
abide by the provisions in UNCLOS, the resolution in the SCS will be univer-
sally satisfactory and will provide more certainty in the region.233 
The Philippines could also assert an additional claim against China for the 
unlawful use of force in violation of UNCLOS, the UN Charter, and customary 
international law.234 Although China’s maritime presence in Scarborough Shoal 
and the Spratlys Islands are civilian forces and thus are theoretically unarmed, 
the ships have been aggressive towards the Philippines.235 China has been clear 
that it does not want to start a war.236 As the director of the Center on Asian 
and Globalization Huang Jing put it, “[W]hat China is doing is putting both 
hands behind its back and using its big belly to push [the Philippines] out, to 
dare [the Philippines] to hit first.”237 Although the arbitral tribunal will likely 
find that China’s increasingly aggressive actions constitute an unlawful threat 
of force, it will probably refrain from granting an additional order precluding 
China from resorting to further threats.238 The clarification provided by the 
legal characterization of the features will sufficiently decrease the tension in 
the SCS caused by the ambiguity of the claims and will be the crucial first step 
towards joint development of the resources.239 
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4. Implementation Issues 
The Annex VII tribunals have a reputation for exercising common sense 
and restraint when evaluating cases, and that type of authority is desperately 
needed in this particularly complex dispute.240 The Annex VII decision will be 
respected by all parties because the holding will advance the purpose of the 
Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement system— it will balance the rights 
of coastal states with the freedoms enjoyed by all states.241 This purpose is 
clearly recognized and respected, evident from the record of compliance with 
these dispute settlement decisions.242 Furthermore, a decision from the arbitral 
tribunal is particularly important due to the fact that the dispute is hindering 
economic development in the SCS.243 This decision will serve all parties in-
volved in the SCS by releasing the tension between claimant states.244 It will 
narrow the areas in dispute, provide a clear source of legal authority, and 
thereby, enable joint development opportunities.245 
Although the decision by the arbitral tribunal is final and binding, there is 
no enforcement mechanism that can ensure China obeys the order.246 In over 
95 percent of cases decided by an arbitral tribunal, however, the state that “los-
es” did comply.247 While China may feel entitled to reject the application of 
UNCLOS in this dispute as well as the findings of the arbitral tribunal, this 
would likely be extremely damaging to China’s larger interests.248 There is a 
heavy price to pay for defying an international court order that is recognized as 
legitimate, fair, and appropriate, and China would risk being branded an “in-
ternational outlaw.”249 It is unclear, however, how much of an effect that will 
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have on China, as it has to provide for nearly 1.4 billion people, all eager for 
growing displays of Chinese nationalism.250 
B. Adjudication: Deciding Sovereignty Based on China’s Objectionable 
Expansion into the South China Sea 
If this dispute were instead brought before the ICJ, assuming adjudication 
is an available dispute resolution mechanism, it would likely result in the same 
outcome regarding the legal characterization of the disputed features as arbitra-
tion, however, ownership over the features may be come out differently.251 The 
Philippines has explicitly named the islands and offshore features that it seeks 
to be legally characterized, and thus, the court will likely find no issue in mak-
ing determinations about the six features of the Scarborough Shoal, the seven 
features within the Spratly Islands, and Mischief Reef.252 In Nicaragua v. Hon-
duras, the court applied UNCLOS when the parties identified the offshore fea-
tures they sought to characterize, and therefore, the court will likely apply the 
provisions of the Convention to the offshore features named by the Philippines 
and make the same findings as the arbitral tribunal.253 
Unlike the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, if the court determined any of the 
features to be islands, the court could decide the question of sovereignty, but it 
would likely not find in the Philippines’ favor.254 The ICJ could find Chinese 
sovereignty over the features under the principle of uti possidetis juris because 
China’s claims in the SCS, particularly over the Spratlys Islands, derive from 
Japan’s surrender of the islands in World War II.255 The Philippines, however, 
has a strong argument that China cannot show that a predecessor state allocat-
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ed the offshore features to China as the successor state, and therefore, sover-
eignty cannot be justified under uti possidetis juris.256 
To strengthen its sovereignty claim, China could also present evidence of 
effectivités over the disputed features.257 In Scarborough Shoal, China exercis-
es fishing activities and naval patrols and has surrounded the area with fisher-
man, fishing administration ships, marine-surveillance ships, and navy war-
ships.258 In the Spratlys Islands, the Chinese are extending their effective exer-
cise of authority by instituting a similar “cabbage strategy.”259 China exercises 
administrative and military control in Mischief Reef, where it has constructed 
a military outpost, which successfully serves as the harbor for the Chinese 
ships that patrol the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys Islands.260 Although 
predominately a civilian maritime force, the ICJ will likely find that China’s 
actions evidence a sufficient display of effectivités to support its sovereignty 
claim.261 Furthermore, the Philippines has little evidence of effectivités to 
counter China’s claim as it has done very little to develop the islands it 
holds.262 Although the Philippines stationed troops in the Spratlys Islands to 
assert administrative control, the settlements are little more than crude, stilted 
structures over shallow water and sandbars, or in the case of Ayungin Reef, a 
grounded naval ship.263 
The ICJ would also likely consider China’s map containing the Nine-
Dash Line as evidence confirming China’s sovereignty over the disputed is-
lands.264 Although a map, by itself, cannot constitute a territorial title, it would 
provide support to China’s already strong claim of sovereignty in the disputed 
areas.265 The Philippines’ strongest counterargument would be to highlight the 
lack of recognition by third states and absence of bilateral treaties that support 
China’s claim to sovereignty.266 The SCS, however, is the site of one of the 
most contentious and most complicated disputes with multiple overlapping 
claims between six claimant states.267 While the ICJ might determine that this 
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is an explicit acknowledgement that China does not have sovereignty, it would 
not be sufficient to show that the Philippines is the rightful sovereign.268 It 
would likely not be enough to undermine China’s position.269 
Considering the four principles in totality, the ICJ would likely determine 
that China could produce sufficient evidence to sustain its sovereignty claim 
over the disputed islands, particularly due to its ability to show effectivités in 
the Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands, and Mischief Reef.270 Furthermore, in 
coming to this unfavorable decision towards the Philippines, the ICJ would be 
forced to consider objectionable assertions by China into the SCS as evidence 
of sovereign control, most of which are being challenged by the Philippines in 
raising this claim for international review.271 Adjudication would be a more 
favorable path for the Philippines than arbitration only if the ICJ does not clas-
sify the offshore features as islands entitling China to a 200 nm EEZ and Con-
tinental Shelf.272 As discussed above, the ICJ would likely grant sovereignty of 
these features to China, thus greatly increasing China’s sphere of influence in 
the SCS.273 Adjudication would be favorable to the Philippines only if the off-
shore features were not classified as islands.274 If considered rocks, the features 
would be limited to a 12 nm territorial sea; if considered underwater features, 
they will be under the control of the Philippines (and not subject to an inde-
pendent claim of sovereignty) because they are located on the Philippines’ con-
tinental shelf.275 Therefore, the Philippines should not submit this case to adju-
dication before the ICJ because the decision would likely not fall in the Philip-
pines’ favor, it would legitimize China’s actions and greatly increase China’s 
access to the resources in the South China Sea.276 
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C. Negotiations: Insufficient Authority to Deter China 
Negotiations are an inadequate approach to resolving this dispute because 
the Philippines requires a binding decision-making authority to stop China 
from continuing to bully the Philippines and other states bordering the South 
China Sea.277 The ambiguity of China’s claims over the “islands and adjacent 
waters” has resulted in confusion among the ASEAN states as to what is genu-
inely in dispute and what is not.278 The ASEAN parties had been operating un-
der the assumption that the Spratlys Islands and other key features were not 
legally islands, but merely rocks and therefore, entitled only to a 12 nm territo-
rial sea.279 This notable difference in positions highlights the need for the Phil-
ippines, as the first ASEAN state to raise this conflict to an international tribu-
nal, to have these assumptions regarding the SCS codified into law by an arbi-
tral tribunal.280 A judgment by the arbitral tribunal in the Philippines’ favor 
would strengthen the legal basis of all of the ASEAN states’ maritime 
claims.281 It would also enable them to present a united front to China in sup-
port of the position that the only acceptable basis for maritime claims in the 
SCS must be under UNCLOS.282 
The Philippines may be required to engage in negotiations if the arbitral 
tribunal finds that the DOC is a standing, formal agreement that binds the sign-
ing parties to negotiations as the sole means of dispute resolution.283 The DOC, 
however, does not include any self-contained clauses that exclude any further 
procedure; therefore, it is likely that the Philippines will not be solely restricted 
to negotiations to settle this dispute.284 Consequently, the tribunal will likely 
find that the Philippines may lawfully exercise their right to submit the dispute 
to the procedures under Part XV Section 2.285 Furthermore, as the Philippines 
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and China have already engaged in several years of negotiations without reso-
lution, China cannot claim that the Philippines must participate in further ne-
gotiations.286 
Invoking the Annex VII arbitration process is a key aspect to the Philip-
pines’ strategy in the SCS and its only option given its power asymmetry with 
China.287 While the Philippines has been bolstering its defense and maritime 
law enforcement with the help of the United States, warming Sino-U.S. rela-
tions put limits on what Manila can expect from its ally.288 At the East Asia 
Summit in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed the United States’ 
desire for a binding code of conduct in the SCS and welcomed the legal pro-
cesses offered under UNCLOS.289 Although this signified to the Philippines 
tacit approval by the United States of its decision, the United States has also 
been clear that it would not take sides in the dispute over sovereignty.290 Ulti-
mately, the arbitration process levels the playing field between the Philippines 
and China and ensures the fairest outcome the Philippines can achieve on its 
own.291 
CONCLUSION 
The Annex VII approach would be the most effective resolution method 
and would lead to the most favorable outcome for the Philippines. The Philip-
pines will likely not pursue adjudication in ICJ because the court would likely 
grant sovereignty over any islands to China. Furthermore, in coming to this 
unfavorable decision towards the Philippines, the ICJ would legitimize China’s 
actions in the SCS as evidence of China’s sovereignty. These actions are exact-
ly what the Philippines is challenging in raising this dispute to the international 
arena. Allowing the ICJ to validate these actions, therefore, does not further the 
Philippines’ purposes. Finally, continued negotiations are also not a viable op-
tion for the Philippines because any agreement would be inadequate to deter 
China from future actions in the SCS. The Philippines needs a judgment from a 
binding authority in order to strengthen the legal basis of all of the ASEAN 
states’ claims. 
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Given that the SCS is central to the Southeast Asian economies due to its 
abundance of natural resources, ensuring access to these resources is an im-
portant consideration for the Philippines. A holding in the Philippines’ favor 
would enable the ASEAN states to present a united front to China that the only 
acceptable basis for maritime claims in the SCS must be under UNCLOS. Fur-
thermore, a decision by the tribunal establishing UNCLOS as the predominant 
authority governing the SCS disputes will benefit all parties by narrowing the 
areas in dispute and opening the door for joint development. Overall, not only 
will arbitration lead to the most efficient and favorable outcome for the Philip-
pines, it will also lay the groundwork for future stability among all claimant 
states in the SCS. 
   
 
